CVE-2019-1615
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the Image Signature Verification feature of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker with administrator-level credentials to install a malicious software image on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to improper verification of digital signatures for software images. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by loading an unsigned software image on an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to boot a malicious software image. Note: The fix for this vulnerability requires a BIOS upgrade as part of the software upgrade. For additional information, see the Details section of this advisory. Nexus 3000 Series Switches are affected running software versions prior to 7.0(3)I7(5). Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in ACI Mode are affected running software versions prior to 13.2(1l). Nexus 9000 Series Switches in Standalone NX-OS Mode are affected running software versions prior to 7.0(3)I7(5). Nexus 9500 R-Series Line Cards and Fabric Modules are affected running software versions prior to 7.0(3)F3(5).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceImage Signature Verification in Cisco NX-OS Software fails to properly verify digital signatures on software images, allowing an authenticated local attacker with administrator credentials to install and boot a malicious unsigned software image on affected Nexus switches. The vulnerability affects multiple Nexus product lines (3000 Series, 9000 Series in ACI and Standalone modes, 9500 R-Series) running specific older software versions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0\(3\)i7\(3\)= 9.2\(1\)= 12.3\(0.97\)= 7.0\(3\)i7\(5\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check NX-OS version installedExecute 'show version' on the switch CLI and locate the 'NXOS' or 'system:' version lineAffected if The displayed NX-OS version exactly matches 7.0(3)I7(3), 7.0(3)I7(5), 9.2(1), or 12.3(0.97)
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Identify the switch modelExecute 'show version' and look for the 'cisco Nexus' model identifier (e.g., Nexus 3000, Nexus 9000, Nexus 9500 R-Series)Affected if The device is a Nexus 3000 Series, 9000 Series (ACI or Standalone mode), or 9500 R-Series switch running one of the vulnerable versions from step 1
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Verify image signature verification configurationExecute 'show boot' and review the boot variables; also check 'show running-config | include signature' or 'show system verification' if availableAffected if Image signature verification is enabled (the vulnerability allows unsigned images to be booted despite verification being present)
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Confirm administrator access capabilityThis is a local authenticated attack - determine if you have administrator/admin credentials to the switchAffected if The attacker would need administrator-level credentials to exploit this flaw, but for detection purposes, focus on version and model identification from steps 1-2
You are affected if your Nexus 3000/9000/9500 R-Series switch runs exactly version 7.0(3)I7(3), 7.0(3)I7(5), 9.2(1), or 12.3(0.97) with image signature verification feature present.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Cisco NX-OS Software to patched versions (7.0(3)I7(5), 13.2(1l), or 7.0(3)F3(5) depending on platform) and ensure the BIOS upgrade included with the software upgrade is applied.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1615 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1615 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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