Nx OsOperating system · Cisco

CVE-2019-1729

MEDIUM · 6.0 CVSS v3.1 Published 2019-05-15
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 7.0 or later.
See remediation →
62/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A vulnerability in the CLI implementation of a specific command used for image maintenance for Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to overwrite any file on the file system including system files. These file overwrites by the attacker are accomplished at the root privilege level. The vulnerability occurs because there is no verification of user-input parameters and or digital-signature verification for image files when using a specific CLI command. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and issuing a command at the CLI. Because an exploit could allow the attacker to overwrite any file on the disk, including system files, a denial of service (DoS) condition could occur. The attacker must have valid administrator credentials for the affected device to exploit this vulnerability.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A vulnerability in the Cisco NX-OS CLI allows an authenticated local attacker with administrator credentials to overwrite any file on the filesystem at root privilege level. The root cause is the lack of user-input parameter validation and digital-signature verification for image files when using a specific CLI maintenance command.

MitigationApply the Cisco patch/更新 for this vulnerability. Until patched, strictly control administrator account access and monitor CLI command usage for suspicious activity.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Nx OsOperating system
Affected:< 7.0\(3\)i4\(9\)>= 7.0\(3\)i7, < 7.0\(3\)i7\(4\)>= 7.0\(3\), < 7.0\(3\)f3\(5\)

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify NX-OS software version
    Run 'show version' command on the Cisco NX-OS device CLI to display the installed software version
    Affected if The displayed version falls within any of these ranges: < 7.0(3)i4(9), >= 7.0(3)i7 but < 7.0(3)i7(4), or >= 7.0(3) but < 7.0(3)f3(5)
  2. Confirm administrator accounts exist
    Use 'show user-account' or 'show running-config | include username' to list local administrator accounts configured on the device
    Affected if Any administrator-level accounts are present on the system, providing potential access for an authenticated attacker
  3. Audit recent CLI command history
    Check command logs or history using 'show history' or review syslog/audit logs for usage of the maintenance command related to image file operations
    Affected if The specific vulnerable CLI maintenance command (related to image file handling) has been executed by any administrator user

The environment is affected if the NX-OS version is within the vulnerable ranges AND administrator accounts exist that could execute the unchecked image file maintenance command.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to 7.0 or later
Fixed in 7.0
Interim mitigation

Apply the Cisco patch/更新 for this vulnerability. Until patched, strictly control administrator account access and monitor CLI command usage for suspicious activity.

Fix this in Nx Os Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
12.0 hours of engineering $2,130
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,408.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1729 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1729 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data