CVE-2019-1810
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the Image Signature Verification feature used in an NX-OS CLI command in Cisco Nexus 3000 Series and 9000 Series Switches could allow an authenticated, local attacker with administrator-level credentials to install a malicious software image on an affected device. The vulnerability exists because software digital signatures are not properly verified during CLI command execution. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to install an unsigned software image on an affected device. Note: If the device has not been patched for the vulnerability previously disclosed in the Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-20190306-nxos-sig-verif, a successful exploit could allow the attacker to boot a malicious software image.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability in Cisco Nexus 3000/9000 Series switches exists in the Image Signature Verification feature within NX-OS CLI. An authenticated local attacker with administrator-level credentials can bypass digital signature verification to install an unsigned malicious software image. The vulnerability stems from improper verification of software digital signatures during CLI command execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 6.1\(2\)i3\(4\), < 7.0\(3\)i7\(5\)>= 7.0\(3\)i7\(5a\), < 9.2\(2\)>= 7.0\(3\)i3\(1\), < 7.0\(3\)i7\(1\)>= 7.0\(3\)i7\(2\), < 9.2\(1\)>= 7.0\(3\)i4\(1\), < 7.0\(3\)i7\(5\)>= 7.0\(3\)i4\(2\), < 7.0\(3\)i7\(5\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelRun 'show version' or 'show inventory' in NX-OS CLI to confirm the device is a Cisco Nexus 3000 or 9000 Series switchAffected if The device is NOT a Nexus 3000/9000 series switch (not affected)
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Check NX-OS versionRun 'show version' to obtain the installed NX-OS version numberAffected if The installed version falls outside these ranges: >= 7.0(3)I7(5a), < 9.2(2); >= 7.0(3)I3(1), < 7.0(3)I7(1); >= 7.0(3)I7(2), < 9.2(1); >= 7.0(3)I4(1), < 7.0(3)I7(5); >= 7.0(3)I4(2), < 7.0(3)I7(5); >= 6.1(2)i3(4), < 7.0(3)I7(5)
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Verify Image Signature Verification statusRun 'show image signature verification' in NX-OS CLI to check if the feature is enabledAffected if Image Signature Verification is DISABLED or not configured (the vulnerability only applies when this feature is enabled)
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Test image installation behaviorAttempt to install an unsigned software image using 'install all' or 'reload' command and observe if it completes without signature verification errorsAffected if The system accepts and proceeds with installation of an unsigned image despite Image Signature Verification being configured as enabled
The environment is affected only if it is a Cisco Nexus 3000/9000 series switch running an affected NX-OS version WITH Image Signature Verification feature enabled and actually allowing unsigned image installation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data7.09.2
Apply the Cisco patch for this vulnerability (refer to Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-20190306-nxos-sig-verif for the initial fix). Ensure both this CVE and the related vulnerability are patched to prevent both image installation and malicious boot scenarios.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1810 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1810 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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