CVE-2019-1969
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the implementation of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Access Control List (ACL) feature of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to perform SNMP polling of an affected device, even if it is configured to deny SNMP traffic. The vulnerability is due to an incorrect length check when the configured ACL name is the maximum length, which is 32 ASCII characters. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by performing SNMP polling of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform SNMP polling that should have been denied. The attacker has no control of the configuration of the SNMP ACL name.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA length check bug in Cisco NX-OS SNMP ACL implementation allows unauthenticated SNMP polling even when ACLs are configured to deny SNMP traffic. When the ACL name reaches exactly 32 ASCII characters (the maximum length), the ACL validation fails to execute properly, permitting SNMP access that should be blocked.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0\(3\)i7\(3\)= 9.2\(2\)= 7.0\(3\)f= 9.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check NX-OS versionRun 'show version' or 'show version | include NXOS' to display the installed NX-OS versionAffected if The version matches 7.0(3)i7(3), 7.0(3)f, 9.2, or 9.2(2)
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Verify SNMP is enabledRun 'show snmp' to check if SNMP is configured and enabled on the deviceAffected if SNMP is enabled and listening on the device
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Identify SNMP access listsRun 'show snmp community' or examine the SNMP configuration with 'show run snmp' to find any access lists or ACLs applied to SNMPAffected if An ACL is configured to control SNMP access (either explicitly permitted or denied)
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Measure ACL name lengthsRun 'show ip access-list' or 'show access-lists' to display all configured ACL names, then count the characters in each ACL name used for SNMP filteringAffected if Any ACL name configured for SNMP filtering is exactly 32 characters long
The device is affected if it runs an affected NX-OS version (7.0(3)i7(3), 7.0(3)f, 9.2, or 9.2(2)) and has an ACL with a 32-character name applied to SNMP, allowing unauthenticated SNMP access despite the ACL.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply Cisco-provided patches for NX-OS to fix the length check logic. As a temporary workaround, avoid using 32-character ACL names until the patch can be deployed.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1969 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1969 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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