CVE-2019-6540
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Conexus telemetry protocol utilized within Medtronic MyCareLink Monitor versions 24950 and 24952, CareLink Monitor version 2490C, CareLink 2090 Programmer, Amplia CRT-D, Claria CRT-D, Compia CRT-D, Concerto CRT-D, Concerto II CRT-D, Consulta CRT-D, Evera ICD, Maximo II CRT-D and ICD, Mirro ICD, Nayamed ND ICD, Primo ICD, Protecta ICD and CRT-D, Secura ICD, Virtuoso ICD, Virtuoso II ICD, Visia AF ICD, and Viva CRT-D does not implement encryption. An attacker with adjacent short-range access to a target product can listen to communications, including the transmission of sensitive data.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Conexus telemetry protocol used in Medtronic cardiac devices (MyCareLink Monitor, CareLink Monitor/Programmer, and various ICD/CRT-D devices) lacks encryption implementation. An attacker with adjacent short-range wireless access can passively intercept unencrypted communications containing sensitive patient data and device telemetry.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Medtronic cardiac device model and firmware versionLocate the device inventory or physically inspect the Medtronic cardiac device (MyCareLink Monitor, CareLink Monitor, or ICD/CRT-D device). Record the model number (e.g., 24950, 24952, 2490c, 2090, Amplia, Claria, Compia, Concerto) and firmware version. This information is typically found on the device label or in the device management software.Affected if The device model matches one of the affected products (24950, 24952, 2490c, 2090, Amplia, Claria, Compia, Concerto) and it is running any firmware version.
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Verify Conexus telemetry protocol is activeCheck the device configuration settings or clinical system logs for the Conexus telemetry interface. In the Medtronic device programmer or monitor settings, look for telemetry status, wireless communication status, or remote monitoring settings. Confirm that the Conexus protocol is enabled for wireless communication.Affected if Conexus telemetry is enabled and actively transmitting data via short-range wireless.
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Confirm absence of encryption on telemetry trafficUsing a wireless spectrum analyzer or network monitoring tool capable of receiving the device's short-range wireless signals (typically in the MICS band used for medical implant communication), capture and inspect the telemetry traffic. Look for unencrypted plaintext transmission of patient data or device telemetry. Since the protocol lacks encryption by design, traffic will be readable in cleartext.Affected if Captured telemetry traffic is transmitted in unencrypted, plaintext format that can be read by an adjacent wireless listener.
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Assess physical proximity controls around the deviceInspect the physical environment where the Medtronic device or its bedside monitor is located. Document the accessibility of the device to unauthorized persons, the presence of physical barriers, and the proximity of the device to public or uncontrolled areas.Affected if The device is located in an area where an attacker with short-range wireless access (within a few meters) could feasibly intercept the telemetry signals.
A defender is affected if they have deployed any of the listed Medtronic devices (MyCareLink Monitor, CareLink Monitor, or CRT-D/ICD devices) with Conexus telemetry enabled, as all firmware versions lack encryption and the unencrypted wireless communications can be intercepted by an attacker within range.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement compensating controls including physical security around devices to limit proximity access, network segmentation to isolate medical devices, and monitor for unauthorized wireless listeners. Apply vendor firmware updates when available. Since the protocol itself lacks encryption, replacement or upgrade of affected devices to versions with encrypted telemetry may ultimately be required.
- Consultation16.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing20.0 h
- Review / QA12.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-6540 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-6540 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data