CVE-2020-10266
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUR+ (Universal Robots+) is a platform of hardware and software component sellers, for Universal Robots robots. When installing any of these components in the robots (e.g. in the UR10), no integrity checks are performed. Moreover, the SDK for making such components can be easily obtained from Universal Robots. An attacker could exploit this flaw by crafting a custom component with the SDK, performing Person-In-The-Middle attacks (PITM) and shipping the maliciously-crafted component on demand.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceUniversal Robots+ platform lacks integrity verification for third-party components during installation, allowing attackers with Person-In-The-Middle capability to inject malicious code by intercepting component downloads and replacing them with crafted payloads using the publicly available SDK.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify UR+ platform is in useAccess the robot controller web interface or teach pendant and check if the UR+ platform or any third-party plugins are installedAffected if UR+ components or third-party plugins are present on the controller
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Identify installed UR+ componentsList all installed UR+ applications through the controller interface or configuration filesAffected if Any third-party UR+ applications are installed
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Check for signature verification mechanismInspect the component installation configuration or logs for presence of cryptographic signature validation during installAffected if No signature verification or integrity check is performed during component installation
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Verify download transport securityExamine network configuration or installation logs to determine if TLS with certificate pinning is used for component downloadsAffected if Downloads occur over untrusted channels without certificate validation
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Review installation logs for integrity checksAnalyze UR+ installation logs for any failed or absent integrity validation eventsAffected if Logs show no verification of component integrity before installation
If the UR+ platform is actively used to install third-party components and no cryptographic signature verification is enforced during installation, the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement cryptographic signing of UR+ components using PKI and enforce signature verification in the robot controller before installation; use TLS with certificate pinning to prevent PITM attacks.
- Consultation12.0 h
- Implementation60.0 h
- Testing24.0 h
- Review / QA12.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $30,336.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-10266 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-10266 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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