Nx OsOperating system · Cisco
CVE-2020-3394
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the Enable Secret feature of Cisco Nexus 3000 Series Switches and Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode could allow an authenticated, local attacker to issue the enable command and get full administrative privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need to have valid credentials for the affected device. The vulnerability is due to a logic error in the implementation of the enable command. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by logging in to the device and issuing the enable command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain full administrative privileges without using the enable password. Note: The Enable Secret feature is disabled by default.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA logic error in the enable command implementation on Cisco Nexus 3000/9000 Series Switches allows authenticated local users to bypass the enable password and gain full administrative privileges. An attacker with valid device credentials can exploit this by simply issuing the enable command, even without knowing the enable secret password.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Nx OsOperating system
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelRun 'show version' or 'show inventory' to confirm the device is a Cisco Nexus 3000 or 9000 Series SwitchAffected if Device is a Nexus 3000 or 9000 series switch running NX-OS
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Check NX-OS versionRun 'show version' and look for the NX-OS software version numberAffected if Any version of NX-OS is installed on the affected device (vulnerability affects all versions)
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Verify local authentication is configuredRun 'show running-config | include aaa' and 'show running-config | include username' to check if local user accounts are configuredAffected if Local authentication is enabled with locally-defined user accounts (required for exploitation)
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Check if enable secret is setRun 'show running-config | include enable' to see if an enable secret password is configuredAffected if An enable secret is configured (attacker bypasses this to gain privileges)
User is affected if the device is a Cisco Nexus 3000 or 9000 Series Switch running NX-OS with local user authentication enabled, regardless of enable secret configuration.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the Cisco patch for this vulnerability. Until patched, limit local user access to trusted personnel and consider disabling local authentication in favor of centralized AAA.
Fix this in Nx Os
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-3394 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-3394 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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