CVE-2020-3470
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple vulnerabilities in the API subsystem of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges. The vulnerabilities are due to improper boundary checks for certain user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a crafted HTTP request to the API subsystem of an affected system. When this request is processed, an exploitable buffer overflow condition may occur. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the underlying operating system (OS).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceBuffer overflow vulnerabilities in the API subsystem of Cisco Integrated Management Controller allow unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges via crafted HTTP requests. The flaws stem from improper boundary checks on user-supplied input processed by the API subsystem.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 4.4.1>= 4.0\(1a\), <= 4.0\(4l\)>= 3.0\(1c\), <= 3.0\(4q\)>= 4.0\(1a\), <= 4.0\(2l\)>= 4.1\(1c\), <= 4.1\(1f\)< 3.2.11.3>= 3.1, <= 4.0\(4l\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Cisco IMC is presentAccess the system via SSH or console and run 'show imc version' or 'show version' to identify the Cisco Integrated Management Controller software. Alternatively, check the web UI login page for Cisco IMC branding.Affected if The system is running Cisco Integrated Management Controller or Cisco Enterprise NFV Infrastructure Software.
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Determine the IMC software versionRun the command 'show imc version' in the IMC CLI or check the web UI under 'About' or 'Administration > Utilities > About' to obtain the exact version string.Affected if The installed version falls within the affected ranges: any version < 4.4.1 for NFVI; or for IMC: 3.0(1c) through 3.0(4q), 4.0(1a) through 4.0(4l), 4.0(1a) through 4.0(2l), 4.1(1c) through 4.1(1f), any version < 3.2.11.3, or 3.1 through 4.0(4l).
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Verify the API subsystem is accessibleAttempt an HTTP or HTTPS request to the IMC management IP at paths such as /api or /redfish to confirm the API endpoint responds. This can be done with curl: curl -k https://<imc-ip>/apiAffected if The API subsystem responds to HTTP/HTTPS requests, indicating it is enabled and reachable.
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Confirm network exposure of IMC management interfaceCheck the network configuration via 'show network' or the web UI under Network > IP to determine if the IMC interface is bound to a routable IP address accessible from untrusted networks.Affected if The IMC management interface has an IP address in a network accessible from untrusted or public networks, rather than being isolated behind a firewall or ACL.
The environment is affected if the system runs a vulnerable version of Cisco IMC or Cisco Enterprise NFVI software within the specified ranges and the API interface is network-accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data3.2.11.34.4.1
Apply Cisco security patches for IMC when available; if patching is not immediately possible, restrict network access to the IMC management interface using network segmentation or firewall rules to limit exposure to trusted networks only.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-3470 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-3470 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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