CVE-2021-1230
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) for Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) mode could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a routing process to crash, which could lead to a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to an issue with the installation of routes upon receipt of a BGP update. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted BGP update to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the routing process to crash, which could cause the device to reload. This vulnerability applies to both Internal BGP (IBGP) and External BGP (EBGP). Note: The Cisco implementation of BGP accepts incoming BGP traffic from explicitly configured peers only. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to send a specific BGP update message over an established TCP connection that appears to come from a trusted BGP peer.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCVE-2021-1230 is a BGP route installation vulnerability in Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches running in ACI mode. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a crafted BGP update message over an established TCP connection from a trusted BGP peer, causing the routing process to crash and forcing the device to reload. The vulnerability affects both IBGP and EBGP configurations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 12.0\(1m\)= 12.0\(1n\)= 12.0\(1o\)= 12.0\(1p\)= 12.0\(1q\)= 12.0\(1r\)= 12.0\(2f\)= 12.0\(2g\)= 12.0\(2h\)= 12.0\(2l\)= 12.0\(2m\)= 12.0\(2n\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelRun 'show version' or 'show inventory' to confirm the hardware is Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric SwitchAffected if Device is not a Nexus 9000 Series model, then not affected
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Verify the ACI mode deploymentRun 'show system mode' or 'show fabric mode' to confirm the device is running in ACI modeAffected if Device is running in standalone NX-OS mode rather than ACI mode, then not affected
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Check the NX-OS versionRun 'show version' and compare the installed version against the affected list: 12.0(1m), 12.0(1n), 12.0(1o), 12.0(1p), 12.0(1q), 12.0(1r), 12.0(2f), 12.0(2g), 12.0(2h), 12.0(2l), 12.0(2m), 12.0(2n)Affected if Installed version matches one of these specific versions, then potentially affected
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Confirm BGP is enabledRun 'show bgp summary' or 'show ip bgp summary' to verify BGP routing process is configured and activeAffected if BGP is not configured or not running, then not vulnerable because the attack requires an established BGP session
The environment is affected if the device is a Nexus 9000 Series in ACI mode, runs a matched affected NX-OS version (12.0(1m) through 12.0(2n)), and has BGP enabled with an active peering session.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply Cisco security patches for affected Nexus 9000 Series devices and implement additional BGP route validation and filtering controls to reject malformed BGP updates.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-1230 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-1230 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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