CVE-2021-1523
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) Mode could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a queue wedge on a leaf switch, which could result in critical control plane traffic to the device being dropped. This could result in one or more leaf switches being removed from the fabric. This vulnerability is due to mishandling of ingress TCP traffic to a specific port. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a stream of TCP packets to a specific port on a Switched Virtual Interface (SVI) configured on the device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a specific packet queue to queue network buffers but never process them, leading to an eventual queue wedge. This could cause control plane traffic to be dropped, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition where the leaf switches are unavailable. Note: This vulnerability requires a manual intervention to power-cycle the device to recover.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability in Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in ACI Mode allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a queue wedge by sending TCP packets to a specific port on a Switched Virtual Interface (SVI). The mishandling of ingress TCP traffic causes a packet queue to accumulate buffers without processing them, leading to control plane traffic being dropped and leaf switches being removed from the fabric.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 13.2\(3n\)= 14.2\(4i\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device model and modeRun 'show version' or 'show module' to confirm the hardware is a Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switch. Then check if the switch is running in ACI mode using 'show system mode' or 'show aci mode'Affected if The device is a Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switch running in ACI mode and has SVIs configured
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Determine the installed NX-OS versionExecute 'show version' and locate the NX-OS software version string (typically displayed as 'system: version X.X(Xn)' or similar)Affected if The installed version is exactly 13.2(3n) or exactly 14.2(4i)
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Verify if Switched Virtual Interfaces are configuredRun 'show ip interface brief' or 'show interface vlan' to list all active SVIs on the deviceAffected if Any SVI interfaces are present and active on the switch
The environment is affected if the device is a Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switch in ACI Mode running NX-OS version 13.2(3n) or 14.2(4i) with Switched Virtual Interfaces configured.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply Cisco-provided patches or firmware updates for this vulnerability; until then, consider implementing ACLs or network segmentation to restrict unauthorized access to SVI interfaces.
Contact Cisco for specific fixed release (advisory provides fixed software releases for versions 13.2 and 14.2)
- Contact Cisco TAC or access the official Cisco Security Advisory (cisco.com) to obtain the fixed software release for your Nx OS version
- Download the recommended fixed software release from the Cisco Software Download center
- Schedule a maintenance window as the advisory notes manual power-cycle is required for recovery
- Follow Cisco's standard upgrade procedure for Nexus 9000 Series switches in ACI mode
- After upgrade, verify the switch is properly rejoined to the fabric and SVI interfaces are functioning correctly
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-1523 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-1523 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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