CVE-2021-3788
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn exposed debug interface was reported in some Motorola-branded Binatone Hubble Cameras that could allow an attacker with physical access unauthorized access to the device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceAn exposed debug interface on Motorola-branded Binatone Hubble Cameras allows an attacker with physical access to gain unauthorized access to the device. The debug interface was left accessible in production devices, bypassing any authentication that would normally protect the camera system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 03.50.14< 03.40.02< 03.40.00all versions< 03.40.00all versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify camera modelLocate the model number printed on the camera device or listed in the mobile app/device settings. Match against the list: Halo+, Comfort 85 Connect, Mbp3855, Focus 68, Focus 72r, Cn28, Cn50, Comfort 40.Affected if The model is Focus 68, Cn28, Cn50, or Comfort 40 (all versions affected) or any other model with firmware version below the specified threshold.
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Check firmware versionAccess the camera settings via the Hubble app or the camera's web interface (if available) and navigate to the 'About' or 'Device Info' section to view the firmware version. Alternatively, check the vendor app for firmware information.Affected if The firmware version is below 03.50.14 for Halo+, below 03.40.02 for Comfort 85 Connect, below 03.40.00 for Mbp3855 or Focus 72r, or any version for Focus 68, Cn28, Cn50, or Comfort 40.
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Inspect debug ports on devicePhysically examine the camera for exposed serial headers, USB ports, or JTAG connectors on the device body or circuit board after removing the housing. Use a multimeter or logic analyzer to identify active debug interfaces.Affected if Any debug interface (serial, JTAG, USB debugging) is physically accessible and not protected by a case or tamper-evident seal.
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Verify physical placementAssess whether the camera is located in an area where unauthorized individuals could gain physical access to touch, open, or manipulate the device.Affected if The camera is installed in a publicly accessible or unsecured location where physical access cannot be controlled.
You are affected if your camera model matches one of the listed products and your firmware version falls below the specified threshold, or if your model has no fix at all (Focus 68, Cn28, Cn50, Comfort 40), and the device debug interface could be reached by someone with physical access.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped03.40.0003.40.0203.50.14
Restrict physical access to affected camera devices and contact the vendor for firmware updates that remove or disable the debug interface. If updates are unavailable, implement compensating controls such as placing cameras in secure locations.
Halo+ Camera: 03.50.14 | Comfort 85 Connect: 03.40.02 | Mbp3855: 03.40.00 | Focus 72r: 03.40.00
- Identify your camera model by checking the device label or Hubble app device information
- Navigate to the Binatone Hubble support page (binatoneglobal.com) or use the Hubble app to check for firmware updates
- Download the firmware update for your specific model: Halo+ to version 03.50.14 or later; Comfort 85 Connect to version 03.40.02 or later; Mbp3855 to version 03.40.00 or later; Focus 72r to version 03.40.00 or later
- Follow the manufacturer's firmware update instructions, typically via the Hubble app or SD card method
- After updating, verify the firmware version has been successfully applied in the device settings
- For devices with 'all versions' affected (Focus 68, Cn28, Cn50, Comfort 40), contact Binatone/Hubble support directly to confirm if a patched firmware is available or if there are alternative mitigations
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-3788 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-3788 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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