CVE-2023-20169
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System (IS-IS) protocol of Cisco NX-OS Software for the Cisco Nexus 3000 Series Switches and Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause the IS-IS process to unexpectedly restart, which could cause an affected device to reload. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation when parsing an ingress IS-IS packet. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted IS-IS packet to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition due to the unexpected restart of the IS-IS process, which could cause the affected device to reload. Note: The IS-IS protocol is a routing protocol. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be Layer 2 adjacent to the affected device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in Cisco NX-OS Software for Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series switches allows an unauthenticated, Layer 2 adjacent attacker to send a crafted IS-IS packet that triggers insufficient input validation during packet parsing, causing the IS-IS process to unexpectedly restart and the device to reload.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 10.3\(2\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the NX-OS version running on the deviceExecute 'show version' or 'show version | include NXOS' in the NX-OS CLI to retrieve the installed software versionAffected if The version displayed is exactly 10.3(2)
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Verify if IS-IS protocol is enabledExecute 'show isis status' or 'show protocol' in the NX-OS CLI to check whether the IS-IS process is running on any interfaceAffected if IS-IS is active and running on one or more interfaces (vulnerable only if IS-IS is enabled)
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Confirm the specific version string matches the affected releaseLocate the exact version number in the 'show version' output (typically shown as 'NXOS: version 10.3(2)' or similar)Affected if The version string is exactly 10.3(2) AND IS-IS is enabled
The device is affected only if it runs NX-OS version 10.3(2) exactly AND has IS-IS protocol enabled and processing traffic on Layer 2 adjacent network segments.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply the Cisco vendor patch when available. Until then, limit Layer 2 adjacency to trusted devices and consider filtering IS-IS traffic at network boundaries to reduce attack surface.
Fixed NX-OS release as specified in the Cisco security advisory for CVE-2023-20169 (obtain from sec.cloudapps.cisco.com)
- 1. Identify the Cisco Nexus 3000 Series or Nexus 9000 Series switch currently running NX-OS version 10.3(2)
- 2. Access the Cisco Security Advisories page at sec.cloudapps.cisco.com and search for CVE-2023-20169
- 3. Locate the fixed NX-OS release for your specific switch model
- 4. Download the appropriate fixed NX-OS software version from the Cisco software download center
- 5. Plan an upgrade window following Cisco NX-OS upgrade best practices, including backing up the current configuration
- 6. Upgrade the device to the fixed NX-OS version using the standard upgrade procedure for your platform
- 7. Verify the IS-IS process is running normally after the upgrade
- 8. Confirm the device is no longer vulnerable by validating the new NX-OS version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-20169 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-20169 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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