CVE-2023-2071
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Machine Edition on the PanelView Plus, improperly verifies user’s input, which allows unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code executed via crafted malicious packets. The device has the functionality, through a CIP class, to execute exported functions from libraries. There is a routine that restricts it to execute specific functions from two dynamic link library files. By using a CIP class, an attacker can upload a self-made library to the device which allows the attacker to bypass the security check and execute any code written in the function.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThis is an input validation vulnerability in Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk View Machine Edition on PanelView Plus HMIs. An unauthenticated attacker can achieve remote code execution by sending crafted malicious packets through a CIP class. The vulnerability exploits the device's library execution functionality: there is normally a routine restricting execution to specific functions in two DLL files, but by uploading a self-made library via a CIP class, an attacker can bypass this security check and execute arbitrary code.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 13.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm FactoryTalk View Machine Edition installationLocate the FactoryTalk View installation on the PanelView Plus HMI and identify the installed version through the product interface or system informationAffected if The product is FactoryTalk View Machine Edition on a PanelView Plus HMI with version 13.0 or lower
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Verify the CIP communication service is runningCheck if the CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) service is enabled and listening on the device, typically on port 44818 for EtherNet/IP communicationsAffected if CIP service is exposed and accessible on the network, allowing external packets to reach the device
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Confirm library loading feature is accessibleDetermine if the library execution functionality is available on the device - this feature normally restricts execution to specific functions in DLL files but can be bypassed via CIP class library uploadsAffected if The library loading mechanism is enabled and accepts library uploads through CIP classes without proper authentication validation
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Assess network exposure of the HMI deviceExamine whether the PanelView Plus HMI is directly accessible from untrusted network segments or the internet, rather than being isolated on a protected network segmentAffected if The device accepts CIP traffic from untrusted or external network sources without network segmentation or access controls
A user is affected if they have a PanelView Plus HMI running FactoryTalk View Machine Edition version 13.0 or lower with CIP services exposed to untrusted networks, as the vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass library execution restrictions via CIP class uploads.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataIsolate affected PanelView Plus devices on separate network segments with strict access controls; apply vendor patches when available; implement compensating controls such as CIP security and network monitoring for anomalous CIP traffic.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $11,776.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-2071 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-2071 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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