CVE-2024-20457
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the logging component of Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM & Presence Service (Unified CM IM&P) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to view sensitive information in clear text on an affected system. This vulnerability is due to the storage of unencrypted credentials in certain logs. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by accessing the logs on an affected system and obtaining credentials that they may not normally have access to. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access sensitive information from the device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM & Presence Service stores authentication credentials in clear text within system logs. An authenticated attacker who can access these logs can read exposed credentials and use them to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or functionality.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 10.0\(1\)= 10.0\(1\)su1= 10.0\(1\)su2= 10.5\(1\)= 10.5\(1\)su1= 10.5\(1\)su2= 10.5\(1\)su3= 10.5\(2\)= 10.5\(2\)su1= 10.5\(2\)su2= 10.5\(2\)su2a= 10.5\(2\)su3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed version of Cisco Unified Communications Manager IM & Presence ServiceRun 'utils system version' or check the Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration interface under System > Version. Alternatively, check the output of 'show version' on the CLI.Affected if The installed version matches one of the affected versions: 10.0(1), 10.0(1)su1, 10.0(1)su2, 10.5(1), 10.5(1)su1, 10.5(1)su2, 10.5(1)su3, 10.5(2), 10.5(2)su1, 10.5(2)su2, 10.5(2)su2a, or 10.5(2)su3.
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Locate IM & Presence Service system logsNavigate to the log directory for the IM & Presence Service, typically found under /var/log/active/ips/log/ or access logs via the Cisco Unified RTMT (Real-Time Monitoring Tool). Check subdirectories such as trace/ips/logs/.Affected if Log files exist and contain authentication credentials stored in plaintext (search for patterns like 'password=', 'credential', or visible username/password pairs).
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Search log files for plaintext credentialsUse grep or a text search tool to search log files for strings containing credentials. Example: grep -r 'password' /var/log/active/ips/log/ or use RTMT to search trace files. Look for entries where credentials appear in clear text rather than masked or hashed.Affected if Any log entry displays authentication credentials (usernames, passwords, tokens) in plaintext form.
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Verify access controls on log directoriesCheck file permissions on the log directories using 'ls -la' and review which users or groups have read access to the IM & Presence Service log directories. Ensure only authorized administrators should have access.Affected if Log directories are readable by users other than the intended administrator or service accounts, allowing unauthorized access to potentially exposed credentials.
You are affected if you are running one of the listed affected versions AND your IM & Presence Service logs contain plaintext authentication credentials that could be accessed by an authenticated attacker.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the Cisco security patch for CVE-2024-20457 and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed in the plaintext logs.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-20457 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-20457 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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