CVE-2024-31467
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThere are buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the underlying CLI service that could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution by sending specially crafted packets destined to the PAPI (Aruba's Access Point management protocol) UDP port (8211). Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities result in the ability to execute arbitrary code as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBuffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in Aruba's PAPI (Access Point management protocol) service listening on UDP port 8211. Unauthenticated attackers can send specially crafted packets to trigger the overflow and achieve remote code execution with privileged (root) system privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 10.3.0.0, < 10.4.1.1>= 10.5.0.0, < 10.5.1.1>= 6.4.0.0, < 8.6.0.24>= 8.7.0.0, < 8.10.0.11CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify PAPI service is accessible on UDP port 8211Scan the device or check firewall rules for open UDP port 8211. On the device, run 'netstat -anu | grep 8211' or 'ss -uan | grep 8211' to confirm the PAPI service is listening.Affected if UDP port 8211 is open and reachable - the service is exposed to network traffic
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Confirm the ArubaOS versionOn the Aruba device, run 'show version' or check '/usr/local/aruba/bin/aruba version' to retrieve the installed OS version.Affected if Version is >= 10.3.0.0 and < 10.4.1.1, OR >= 10.5.0.0 and < 10.5.1.1 - falls within vulnerable version ranges
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Confirm the HP InstantOS versionOn the HP InstantOS device, run 'show version' to retrieve the installed OS version.Affected if Version is >= 6.4.0.0 and < 8.6.0.24, OR >= 8.7.0.0 and < 8.10.0.11 - falls within vulnerable version ranges
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Check if PAPI process is runningRun 'show process' or check running processes for papi service. On CLI, use 'show process name papi' or 'ps -ef | grep papi'.Affected if PAPI process is active and bound to port 8211
The device is vulnerable if it runs a version within the affected ranges AND has UDP port 8211 accessible, allowing unauthenticated attackers to reach the PAPI service.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped8.6.0.248.10.0.1110.4.1.1
Apply the vendor-supplied security patch for this vulnerability immediately. As an interim control, restrict or block external access to UDP port 8211 until the patch can be deployed.
ArubaOS 10.4.1.1 (for 10.3.x users) or 10.5.1.1 (for 10.5.x users); InstantOS 8.6.0.24 (for 6.4.x-8.5.x users) or 8.10.0.11 (for 8.7.x-8.9.x users)
- 1. Obtain the fixed ArubaOS or InstantOS version from the official Aruba support portal (support.hpe.com or www.arubanetworks.com)
- 2. Upload the firmware image to the Aruba controller via WebUI or SCP
- 3. Initiate the upgrade through the controller's WebUI or CLI (execute 'upgrade-software' command)
- 4. Allow the controller to reboot and apply the new firmware
- 5. After reboot, verify the running version matches the expected fixed release using 'show version' command
- 6. Confirm that UDP port 8211 (PAPI) service is running and the system is operational
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-31467 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-31467 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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