CVE-2024-42177
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHCL MyXalytics is affected by SSL∕TLS Protocol affected with BREACH & LUCKY13 vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit the weakness in the ciphers to intercept and decrypt encrypted data, steal sensitive information, or inject malicious code into the system.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceHCL MyXalytics uses SSL/TLS cipher suites vulnerable to the BREACH and LUCKY13 attacks. BREACH exploits HTTP compression side channels to extract secrets from encrypted responses, while LUCKY13 is a padding oracle attack on CBC-mode cipher suites in TLS. Attackers can leverage these to decrypt traffic, steal sensitive data, or inject malicious content.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 6.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm HCL MyXalytics is installedLocate the Dryice Myxalytics installation directory or check running services for MyXalytics processes. Common paths include /opt/hcl/myXalytics or C:\Program Files\HCL\MyXalytics on Windows.Affected if The product is present on the system
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Identify the installed versionCheck the version of Dryice Myxalytics by reviewing the product documentation, installation files, or running 'myxalytics --version' if a CLI is available. Look in version.txt, about screen, or the application properties.Affected if The version is exactly 6.3 (note: only this specific version is listed as affected)
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Check TLS compression configurationReview the TLS/SSL configuration files for MyXalytics (typically in config/ssl.conf, config/tls.conf, or similar). Look for directives enabling compression such as 'SSLCompression on', 'Deflate', or 'gzip' in the TLS settings.Affected if TLS compression is enabled in the configuration
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Identify enabled TLS cipher suitesExamine the cipher suite configuration in the TLS settings. Look for CBC-mode cipher suites such as TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, or similar CBC-based suites.Affected if CBC-mode cipher suites are listed in the enabled ciphers and AEAD ciphers like AES-GCM are not prioritized or are absent
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Verify TLS configuration exposureIf possible, perform a TLS scan using tools like nmap with the ssl-enum-ciphers script or testssl.sh against the MyXalytics endpoint to enumerate actual supported cipher suites and compression settings.Affected if The scan reveals TLS compression is enabled or weak CBC cipher suites are available
A system is affected if HCL Dryice Myxalytics version 6.3 is running with TLS compression enabled or vulnerable CBC-mode cipher suites configured, as these enable BREACH and LUCKY13 attack vectors.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable TLS compression to mitigate BREACH; disable CBC-mode cipher suites and enable AEAD ciphers (e.g., AES-GCM) to mitigate LUCKY13. Review and harden the TLS configuration according to current best practices.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-42177 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-42177 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data