Chamilo LmsApplication · Chamilo

CVE-2026-34370

MEDIUM · 6.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-04-14
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 1.11.38 or later.
See remediation →
71/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Chamilo LMS is an open-source learning management system. In versions prior to 2.0.0-RC.3, the notebook module contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability that allows any authenticated student to read the private course notes of any other user on the platform by manipulating the notebook_id parameter in the editnote action. The application fetches the note content using only the supplied integer ID without verifying that the requesting user owns the note, and the full title and HTML body are rendered in the edit form and returned to the attacker's browser. While ownership checks exist in the write paths (updateNote() and delete_note()), they are entirely absent from the read path (get_note_information()). This issue has been fixed in version 2.0.0-RC.3.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Chamilo LMS versions prior to 2.0.0-RC.3 contain an IDOR vulnerability in the notebook module's get_note_information() function. The read path lacks ownership verification, allowing any authenticated student to view other users' private course notes by manipulating the notebook_id parameter in the editnote action. The full note title and HTML content are returned to the attacker without authorization checks.

MitigationUpgrade to Chamilo LMS version 2.0.0-RC.3 or later, which implements ownership verification in the get_note_information() function. Alternatively, manually add authorization checks to verify the requesting user owns the note before returning content.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Chamilo LmsApplication
Affected:<= 1.11.38= 2.0.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Determine Chamilo LMS installed version
    Check the version file or admin panel for the exact Chamilo LMS version number installed in your environment
    Affected if The installed version is 1.11.38 or lower, or exactly 2.0.0 (these are the affected versions per the CVE)
  2. Verify notebook module is accessible
    Log in as an authenticated student and confirm the notebook feature is available in the course interface
    Affected if The notebook module is enabled and accessible to students - the vulnerability only applies when this module is active
  3. Inspect notebook editnote functionality
    Locate the get_note_information() function in the notebook module code - this is the function that retrieves note content without ownership verification
    Affected if The get_note_information() function exists and retrieves notes based solely on the notebook_id parameter without checking if the requesting user owns the note
  4. Check for ownership verification in note retrieval
    Review the code logic in get_note_information() to determine if it verifies that the authenticated user owns the notebook_id being requested
    Affected if The function retrieves and displays note content (title and HTML body) using only the supplied notebook_id without validating user ownership - this is the vulnerable condition
  5. Test IDOR manually if code review is not possible
    As an authenticated student, create a private note, then attempt to access another user's note by manipulating the notebook_id parameter in the editnote action URL
    Affected if You can view another user's private course note title and HTML body by simply changing the notebook_id value - this confirms the IDOR vulnerability exists

You are affected if your Chamilo LMS version is 1.11.38 or lower, or exactly 2.0.0, the notebook module is enabled, and the get_note_information() function lacks ownership verification, allowing any authenticated student to read other users' private notes by manipulating the notebook_id parameter.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 1.11.38
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to Chamilo LMS version 2.0.0-RC.3 or later, which implements ownership verification in the get_note_information() function. Alternatively, manually add authorization checks to verify the requesting user owns the note before returning content.

Recommended fix High confidence

2.0.0-RC.3 (or later stable release)

  1. 1. Identify all Chamilo LMS instances currently running versions 1.11.38 or earlier, or version 2.0.0
  2. 2. Create a full backup of the database and file system before proceeding with any upgrade
  3. 3. Review the Chamilo upgrade documentation for your current version to ensure compatibility with the target version
  4. 4. Upgrade the Chamilo LMS installation to version 2.0.0-RC.3 or a later stable release that includes this fix
  5. 5. After upgrade, verify the notebook module is functioning correctly by creating test notes
  6. 6. Confirm the fix by verifying that get_note_information() now performs ownership validation before returning note content
Caveat 2.0.0-RC.3 is a Release Candidate; ensure it is stable in a staging environment before deploying to production, as RC versions may contain other unresolved issues

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Chamilo Lms Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,930
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-34370 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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