CVE-2026-3557
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPhilips Hue Bridge hap_pair_verify_handler Sub-TLV Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Philips Hue Bridge. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. The specific flaw exists within the hap_pair_verify_handler function of the hk_hap service, which listens on TCP port 8080 by default. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-28337.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHeap-based buffer overflow in Philips Hue Bridge's hk_hap service (port 8080) in the hap_pair_verify_handler function. The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied data length before copying to a heap buffer, allowing remote code execution as root. Authentication is required but can be bypassed.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1975170000CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify Philips Hue Bridge V2 devices on the networkScan the network for devices responding to HTTP/HTTPS on typical Hue Bridge ports (80, 443) or use UPnP/SSDP discovery. Check device web interface or Hue app for device model information.Affected if Device is confirmed as Philips Hue Bridge V2 and firmware version cannot be verified or is below 1975170000
-
Check installed firmware versionAccess the Hue Bridge web interface (typically https://<bridge-ip>/debug/clip.html) or use the Hue API: GET to /api/<username>/config to retrieve 'swversion' field. Alternatively, check via Hue app device settings.Affected if Firmware version returned is less than 1975170000
-
Verify hk_hap service exposure on port 8080Perform a TCP port scan targeting port 8080 on the bridge IP address using nmap -p 8080 <bridge-ip> or netcat. The hk_hap service handles HomeKit Accessory Protocol pairing.Affected if Port 8080 is open and accessible from any network segment outside the local bridge subnet
-
Assess network accessibility of the bridgeReview network segmentation and firewall rules. Check if the Hue Bridge IP is on the same VLAN as untrusted devices or accessible from guest networks. Document all routes to the bridge's management interfaces.Affected if Bridge is reachable from network segments that contain untrusted or guest devices, or direct internet exposure is present
A user is affected if they have a Philips Hue Bridge V2 with firmware below 1975170000 and port 8080 (hk_hap service) is accessible from any network segment beyond the bridge's isolated management network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data1975170000
Apply vendor firmware update when available; until then, isolate the device on a restricted network segment to limit exposure.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3557 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3557 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data