CVE-2009-2317
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Axesstel MV 410R has a certain default administrator password, and does not force a password change, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Axesstel MV 410R mobile broadband router ships with a hardcoded default administrator password that is publicly known. The device firmware does not enforce or prompt for a password change upon initial setup, allowing remote attackers to authenticate with the default credentials and gain full administrative control.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelAccess the router web interface or check the device label/marketing to confirm the exact model is Axesstel MV 410RAffected if The device is an Axesstel MV 410R router (all versions are affected)
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Check if default credentials are still in useAttempt to log in to the router web management interface using the publicly known default credentials for this device. If the login succeeds without having changed the password, the default credentials are still active.Affected if The default administrator password has not been changed from the factory default
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Verify management interface exposureDetermine if the router web management interface (typically on ports 80/443) is accessible from untrusted network segments or the internet. Check router firewall rules and NAT configuration.Affected if The management interface is exposed to untrusted networks without firewall protection
You are affected if you have an Axesstel MV 410R router where the default administrator password has not been changed and the management interface is accessible to potential attackers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedImmediately change the default administrator password to a strong, unique password. If the device firmware supports it, update to the latest version that may enforce password changes. Consider network segmentation to limit exposure of the management interface.
- This is a hardware firmware vulnerability in a legacy mobile broadband router (Axesstel MV 410r) from 2009.
- No vendor patches or firmware updates are available for this end-of-life device.
- The device has a hardcoded default administrator password that cannot be changed or enforced by the system.
- Decommission this device and replace it with a currently supported router/mobile broadband solution.
- If continued use is absolutely required, isolate the device behind a firewall with strict inbound access controls to limit exposure to remote attackers.
- Ensure the device is not directly accessible from the internet.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2009-2317 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2009-2317 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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