CVE-2009-2320
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe web interface on the Axesstel MV 410R relies on client-side JavaScript code to validate input, which allows remote attackers to send crafted data, and possibly have unspecified other impact, via a client that does not process JavaScript.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Axesstel MV 410R wireless router web interface validates user input only through client-side JavaScript. Attackers can bypass this validation by submitting requests directly (e.g., via curl or custom HTTP tools) without executing the JavaScript, potentially allowing injection attacks, configuration changes, or authentication bypass since the server lacks proper server-side validation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the device on your networkScan your network for devices and check for Axesstel MV 410R router by reviewing DHCP leases, device hostname, or MAC vendor information. Access the router web interface and look for the Axesstel MV 410R model identifier in the header or status page.Affected if The device is confirmed to be an Axesstel MV 410R router
-
Confirm web interface accessibilityAttempt to access the router web interface via HTTP (typically on port 80) by entering the router IP address in a browser or using curl. Note whether the login or configuration pages load.Affected if The router web interface is accessible on the network
-
Test for client-side validation bypassSubmit a direct HTTP POST request to the router (e.g., to the login or configuration endpoints) using a tool like curl, bypassing any JavaScript validation. Include potentially malicious input in the request parameters without using the browser-based form.Affected if The router accepts and processes the request without returning validation errors that would normally be enforced by JavaScript in a browser
If your network contains an Axesstel MV 410R router with an accessible web interface that processes direct HTTP requests without proper server-side validation, your environment is affected by this CVE.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace or retire the legacy device if no firmware update is available; if continued use is required, implement network segmentation and restrict web interface access to prevent external exploitation, as patching the embedded firmware may not be feasible.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,192.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2009-2320 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2009-2320 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data