CVE-2009-2321
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedcgi-bin/sysconf.cgi on the Axesstel MV 410R allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (configuration reset) via a RESTORE=RESTORE query string.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Axesstel MV 410R router's web interface contains a vulnerability in the sysconf.cgi script. By sending an HTTP GET request with the query string 'RESTORE=RESTORE' to this CGI binary, an unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger a configuration reset, causing denial of service. This appears to stem from improper input validation allowing the RESTORE parameter to execute a factory reset without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify if an Axesstel MV 410R router exists in your environmentReview your network device inventory, or scan for devices responding on HTTP port 80 with characteristic Axesstel web interface responses. Check device MAC OUI or HTTP server headers for 'Axesstel' or 'MV410R' signatures.Affected if An Axesstel MV 410R router is present on the network.
-
Confirm the sysconf.cgi script is accessibleFrom a system with network access to the device, attempt an HTTP GET request to http://<device_ip>/cgi-bin/sysconf.cgi. A 200 OK response indicates the CGI endpoint exists.Affected if The device returns a valid HTTP response for the sysconf.cgi endpoint.
-
Check if the web interface is exposed to untrusted networksReview firewall rules, NAT configurations, or ACLs to determine whether the device's web interface (port 80/443) is reachable from network segments outside trusted internal management networks.Affected if The cgi-bin directory or web interface port is accessible from untrusted networks such as the internet or guest VLANs.
-
Verify device is running an affected versionCheck the device's firmware version through its web interface status page, or via SNMP/syslog if available. Since all versions are affected, any firmware version indicates the device is vulnerable.Affected if The device is an Axesstel MV 410R running any firmware version.
You are affected if an Axesstel MV 410R router with its web interface exposed is present in your environment, since all versions contain the unauthenticated sysconf.cgi vulnerability that allows remote factory reset via the RESTORE parameter.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataNetwork access to the device's web interface should be restricted to trusted internal networks or management VLANs. Since this is a 2009 vulnerability on likely end-of-life hardware, the device should be replaced with a supported model. If replacement is not immediately feasible, implement firewall rules to block external access to the cgi-bin directory.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,560.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2009-2321 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2009-2321 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data