CVE-2010-0738
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe JMX-Console web application in JBossAs in Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform (aka JBoss EAP or JBEAP) 4.2 before 4.2.0.CP09 and 4.3 before 4.3.0.CP08 performs access control only for the GET and POST methods, which allows remote attackers to send requests to this application's GET handler by using a different method.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe JMX-Console in JBoss EAP versions 4.2 before 4.2.0.CP09 and 4.3 before 4.3.0.CP08 performs access control checks only for GET and POST HTTP methods. Attackers can bypass authentication by using alternative HTTP methods (such as HEAD, OPTIONS, DELETE, PUT) to access protected JMX-Console functionality without proper authorization.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.2.0= 4.3.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the JMX-Console deploymentCheck if jmx-console.war exists in the JBoss deployment directory (typically $JBOSS_HOME/server/default/deploy/ or the corresponding profile directory). Also verify the web application is accessible at /jmx-console/Affected if The JMX-Console web application is deployed and accessible on the server
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Identify the JBoss EAP versionCheck the version file in the JBoss installation (such as $JBOSS_HOME/readme.txt, or run 'java -jar jboss.jar -version' if available, or check jar manifest files in the lib directory). Compare against 4.2.0.CP09 and 4.3.0.CP08Affected if The installed version is 4.2.0 or 4.3.0 (or any CP version before the respective patch levels)
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Inspect JMX-Console web.xml security constraintsExtract and examine the WEB-INF/web.xml file from the jmx-console.war deployment. Look for <security-constraint> definitions targeting the JMX-Console resourcesAffected if The security-constraint only defines <http-method>GET</http-method> and/or <http-method>POST</http-method>, or has no <http-method> element defined (which defaults to GET only in some configurations)
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Test authentication bypass with alternative HTTP methodsSend an HTTP request using a non-GET/POST method (such as HEAD, OPTIONS, PUT, or DELETE) to the JMX-Console invocation endpoint (for example, /jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=inspectMBean&name=jboss.system:type=Server) without providing credentials. Observe if the request succeeds without a 401/403 responseAffected if The server accepts the request and returns JMX data or a successful response without requiring authentication when using an alternative HTTP method
A user is affected if JBoss EAP 4.2 or 4.3 is running with JMX-Console deployed, the version is before the CP09/CP08 patches respectively, and the web.xml security constraint only restricts GET and POST methods, allowing unauthenticated access via other HTTP methods.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedConfigure the web container to enforce authentication and authorization checks for all HTTP methods, not just GET and POST. This typically involves updating security-constraint definitions in web.xml or restricting JMX-Console access to trusted networks, or disabling it entirely if not required.
JBoss EAP 4.2.0.CP09 or JBoss EAP 4.3.0.CP08
- 1. Back up the current JBoss EAP installation and all configuration files
- 2. Download JBoss EAP 4.2.0.CP09 (for 4.2.x installations) or 4.3.0.CP08 (for 4.3.x installations) from the Red Hat Customer Portal
- 3. Stop the JBoss application server
- 4. Apply the cumulative patch (CP) by following Red Hat's patch installation documentation, or replace the JMX-Console WAR file with the patched version
- 5. Verify that the jmx-console.war/WEB-INF/web.xml file contains security constraint definitions that cover all HTTP methods (not just GET and POST)
- 6. Restart the JBoss application server
- 7. Verify the fix by confirming that all HTTP methods (including OPTIONS, HEAD, DELETE, PUT, etc.) to the JMX-Console require authentication
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-0738 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-0738 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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