Actively exploited in the wild. This CVE is on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list — treat remediation as urgent. Federal remediation due by 15 Jun 2022. Known ransomware use
Jboss Enterprise Application PlatformApplication · Redhat

CVE-2010-0738

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2010-04-28
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
In the wild Ransomware High EPSS Public exploit Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The JMX-Console web application in JBossAs in Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform (aka JBoss EAP or JBEAP) 4.2 before 4.2.0.CP09 and 4.3 before 4.3.0.CP08 performs access control only for the GET and POST methods, which allows remote attackers to send requests to this application's GET handler by using a different method.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The JMX-Console in JBoss EAP versions 4.2 before 4.2.0.CP09 and 4.3 before 4.3.0.CP08 performs access control checks only for GET and POST HTTP methods. Attackers can bypass authentication by using alternative HTTP methods (such as HEAD, OPTIONS, DELETE, PUT) to access protected JMX-Console functionality without proper authorization.

MitigationConfigure the web container to enforce authentication and authorization checks for all HTTP methods, not just GET and POST. This typically involves updating security-constraint definitions in web.xml or restricting JMX-Console access to trusted networks, or disabling it entirely if not required.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Jboss Enterprise Application PlatformApplication
Affected:= 4.2.0= 4.3.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Locate the JMX-Console deployment
    Check if jmx-console.war exists in the JBoss deployment directory (typically $JBOSS_HOME/server/default/deploy/ or the corresponding profile directory). Also verify the web application is accessible at /jmx-console/
    Affected if The JMX-Console web application is deployed and accessible on the server
  2. Identify the JBoss EAP version
    Check the version file in the JBoss installation (such as $JBOSS_HOME/readme.txt, or run 'java -jar jboss.jar -version' if available, or check jar manifest files in the lib directory). Compare against 4.2.0.CP09 and 4.3.0.CP08
    Affected if The installed version is 4.2.0 or 4.3.0 (or any CP version before the respective patch levels)
  3. Inspect JMX-Console web.xml security constraints
    Extract and examine the WEB-INF/web.xml file from the jmx-console.war deployment. Look for <security-constraint> definitions targeting the JMX-Console resources
    Affected if The security-constraint only defines <http-method>GET</http-method> and/or <http-method>POST</http-method>, or has no <http-method> element defined (which defaults to GET only in some configurations)
  4. Test authentication bypass with alternative HTTP methods
    Send an HTTP request using a non-GET/POST method (such as HEAD, OPTIONS, PUT, or DELETE) to the JMX-Console invocation endpoint (for example, /jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=inspectMBean&name=jboss.system:type=Server) without providing credentials. Observe if the request succeeds without a 401/403 response
    Affected if The server accepts the request and returns JMX data or a successful response without requiring authentication when using an alternative HTTP method

A user is affected if JBoss EAP 4.2 or 4.3 is running with JMX-Console deployed, the version is before the CP09/CP08 patches respectively, and the web.xml security constraint only restricts GET and POST methods, allowing unauthenticated access via other HTTP methods.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Configure the web container to enforce authentication and authorization checks for all HTTP methods, not just GET and POST. This typically involves updating security-constraint definitions in web.xml or restricting JMX-Console access to trusted networks, or disabling it entirely if not required.

Recommended fix High confidence

JBoss EAP 4.2.0.CP09 or JBoss EAP 4.3.0.CP08

  1. 1. Back up the current JBoss EAP installation and all configuration files
  2. 2. Download JBoss EAP 4.2.0.CP09 (for 4.2.x installations) or 4.3.0.CP08 (for 4.3.x installations) from the Red Hat Customer Portal
  3. 3. Stop the JBoss application server
  4. 4. Apply the cumulative patch (CP) by following Red Hat's patch installation documentation, or replace the JMX-Console WAR file with the patched version
  5. 5. Verify that the jmx-console.war/WEB-INF/web.xml file contains security constraint definitions that cover all HTTP methods (not just GET and POST)
  6. 6. Restart the JBoss application server
  7. 7. Verify the fix by confirming that all HTTP methods (including OPTIONS, HEAD, DELETE, PUT, etc.) to the JMX-Console require authentication
Caveat Cumulative patches are typically backward-compatible; however, test in a staging environment before production deployment

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Jboss Enterprise Application Platform Exploited in the wild — priority engagement
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
16.0 hours of engineering $2,840
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-0738 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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