CVE-2011-0921
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedcrs.exe in the Cell Manager Service in the client in HP Data Protector does not properly validate credentials associated with the hostname, domain, and username, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by sending unspecified data over TCP, related to the webreporting client, the applet domain, and the java username.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencecrs.exe in HP Data Protector Cell Manager Service fails to properly validate credentials associated with hostname, domain, and username. This authentication bypass allows remote attackers to send specially crafted TCP data to execute arbitrary code, particularly through the webreporting client, applet domain, and java username components.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if HP Data Protector is installedCheck for HP Data Protector installation directory (commonly at C:\Program Files\HP\Data Protector or C:\Program Files\OmniBack) and look for bin\crs.exeAffected if HP Data Protector with crs.exe exists on the system
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Verify the Cell Manager Service (crs.exe) is runningOpen Task Manager or use command 'tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq crs.exe"' to check if crs.exe process is activeAffected if crs.exe process is running - this is the vulnerable component
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Check if webreporting client is enabledInspect HP Data Protector configuration files (typically in etc\opt\omni\cell\server\config or similar) for webreporting or webclient settings, or check Windows Services for 'HP Data Protector Web Reporting' serviceAffected if Webreporting client component is enabled and accessible
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Verify network exposure of Cell Manager ServiceCheck listening ports on the system using 'netstat -an | findstr LISTENING' looking for typical HP Data Protector ports (typically 5555, 5565, or 8080 for webreporting)Affected if Cell Manager Service ports are exposed to untrusted networks rather than isolated internally
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Review Cell Manager configuration for authentication settingsExamine configuration files in the HP Data Protector etc directory for authentication-related settings in the crs or cell manager configurationAffected if Configuration allows unauthenticated or improperly validated remote connections
The system is affected if HP Data Protector with crs.exe is installed and running with webreporting or the Cell Manager Service exposed to network access, since the vulnerability allows authentication bypass via specially crafted TCP data to the crs.exe service.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply HP Data Protector security patches or upgrade to a patched version. Restrict network access to Cell Manager Service ports and disable the webreporting client component if not required.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2011-0921 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-0921 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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