CVE-2011-0924
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe client in HP Data Protector does not verify the contents of files associated with the EXEC_CMD command, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary script code by providing this code with a trusted filename, as demonstrated by omni_chk_ds.sh.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHP Data Protector client fails to verify the contents of files associated with the EXEC_CMD command. Attackers can inject arbitrary script code by placing malicious content in files that appear trusted based on filename alone (e.g., omni_chk_ds.sh), leading to remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify HP Data Protector installationCheck for HP Data Protector installation directory (typically C:\Program Files\HP\Data Protector or /opt/HP/Data Protector) and running processes (omniinet, omni_svr, omni_chk)Affected if HP Data Protector is installed and running
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Confirm EXEC_CMD service is enabledCheck Data Protector cell configuration (cell_server.info or omniorbsvc.cfg) for EXEC_CMD service definition and client configuration for 'EXEC_CMD' permission settingsAffected if EXEC_CMD service is enabled in the Data Protector configuration
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Locate trusted script filesSearch for omni_chk_ds.sh, omni_chk_sv.sh, and similar script files in the Data Protector bin directory (typically /opt/HP/Data Protector/bin or C:\Program Files\HP\Data Protector\bin\)Affected if These script files exist in the Data Protector installation directory
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Inspect script file integrityCompare hash/contents of omni_chk_ds.sh and similar trusted scripts against known-good baselines or verify file permissions and ownership are not alteredAffected if Files have been modified from original or have unexpected permissions/ownership indicating tampering
A user is affected if HP Data Protector with EXEC_CMD enabled is running and trusted script files like omni_chk_ds.sh have been modified or are accessible to untrusted actors
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor patches for HP Data Protector. If no patch available, restrict network access to Data Protector services and disable unnecessary EXEC_CMD functionality until a fix is deployed.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2011-0924 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-0924 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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