CVE-2018-5399
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Auto-Maskin DCU 210E firmware contains an undocumented Dropbear SSH server, v2015.55, configured to listen on Port 22 while the DCU is running. The Dropbear server is configured with a hard-coded user name and password combination of root / amroot. The server is configured to use password only authentication not cryptographic keys, however the firmware image contains an RSA host-key for the server. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to gain root access to the Angstrom Linux operating system and modify any binaries or configuration files in the firmware. Affected releases are Auto-Maskin DCU-210E RP-210E: Versions prior to 3.7 on ARMv7.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Auto-Maskin DCU 210E firmware contains an undocumented Dropbear SSH server (v2015.55) listening on Port 22 with hard-coded credentials (root/amroot). The server uses password-only authentication without key-based enforcement, allowing remote attackers to gain unauthenticated root access to the embedded Angstrom Linux OS and modify any firmware binaries or configuration files.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 3.7< 3.7CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLocate the device label or access the device management interface to confirm the model is either DCU 210E or RP 210E from Auto-MaskinAffected if The device is an Auto-Maskin DCU 210E or RP 210E unit
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Check the installed firmware versionAccess the device admin panel, check system information, or use the command 'cat /etc/version' or 'fw_printenv' if available to retrieve the firmware version numberAffected if The firmware version is less than 3.7
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Verify if port 22 is accessibleFrom an external system, run 'nmap -p 22 <device_ip>' or 'telnet <device_ip> 22' to check if port 22 is open and respondingAffected if Port 22 is open and accepts connections
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Confirm Dropbear SSH bannerConnect to port 22 using netcat or openssl s_client and observe the SSH banner for 'dropbear' or version string indicating DropbearAffected if The SSH banner reveals Dropbear version 2015.55 or similar
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Test hardcoded credential accessAttempt SSH login with username 'root' and password 'amroot' using 'ssh root@<device_ip>'Affected if Authentication succeeds and grants root shell access
A device is affected if it is an Auto-Maskin DCU 210E or RP 210E running firmware version below 3.7, has port 22 open, and accepts the root/amroot SSH credentials.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped3.7
Update DCU-210E firmware to version 3.7 or later to remove the undocumented Dropbear SSH server. If immediate update is not feasible, network-segment the device and block external access to Port 22.
Auto-Maskin DCU-210E / RP-210E Firmware version 3.7 or later
- Contact Auto-Maskin to obtain the firmware version 3.7 or later for your DCU 210E or RP 210E device
- Download the firmware update from an official Auto-Maskin source
- Follow the manufacturer's documented firmware upgrade procedure to apply version 3.7 or later
- After upgrading, verify that the undocumented Dropbear SSH server is no longer present or has been removed/reconfigured
- Change any default credentials if new services are enabled after the upgrade
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-5399 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-5399 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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