CVE-2020-26762
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA stack-based buffer-overflow exists in Edimax IP-Camera IC-3116W (v3.06) and IC-3140W (v3.07), which allows an unauthenticated, unauthorized attacker to perform remote-code-execution due to a crafted GET-Request. The overflow occurs in binary ipcam_cgi due to a missing type check in function doGetSysteminfo(). This has been fixed in version: IC-3116W v3.08.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in ipcam_cgi binary's doGetSysteminfo() function in Edimax IC-3116W (v3.06) and IC-3140W (v3.07) IP cameras. The vulnerability stems from a missing type check when processing crafted GET requests, allowing unauthenticated remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3.06= 3.07CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify camera model and firmware versionAccess the camera's web interface or check the administrative console for the exact model number (IC-3116W or IC-3140W) and firmware version listed in the system information pageAffected if The model is IC-3116W with firmware version 3.06, or IC-3140W with firmware version 3.07
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Verify the ipcam_cgi binary is presentAccess the camera via SSH or telnet if enabled, and check for the presence of the /bin/ipcam_cgi or /usr/bin/ipcam_cgi binaryAffected if The ipcam_cgi binary exists and is running as part of the camera's web service
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Confirm web interface is accessibleAttempt to access the camera's HTTP/HTTPS web interface from the network. Common paths include /cgi-bin/ipcam/ or direct access to the IP addressAffected if The camera's web management interface is reachable on the network (port 80 or 443)
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade firmware to IC-3116W v3.08 (or later). If patching is not immediately feasible, isolate camera management interfaces from untrusted networks to reduce exposure.
IC-3116W v3.08 or later (contact Edimax for IC-3140W specific fixed version)
- 1. Identify the exact model of Edimax IP-Camera in your environment (IC-3116W or IC-3140W)
- 2. Check the current firmware version on each device through the web interface or administrative console
- 3. Download the firmware update from the official Edimax support website (www.edimax.com)
- 4. Access the camera's web administration panel and navigate to the firmware upgrade section
- 5. Upload the appropriate firmware version (v3.08 or later for IC-3116W) and apply the update
- 6. After upgrade, verify the new firmware version is installed and confirm the device is functioning normally
- 7. Repeat for all affected devices in the inventory
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-26762 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-26762 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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