dbcve.org
Jboss Enterprise Application PlatformApplication · Redhat

CVE-2022-0866

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2022-05-10
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 26.1.1 or later.
See remediation →
62/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
This is a concurrency issue that can result in the wrong caller principal being returned from the session context of an EJB that is configured with a RunAs principal. In particular, the org.jboss.as.ejb3.component.EJBComponent class has an incomingRunAsIdentity field. This field is used by the org.jboss.as.ejb3.security.RunAsPrincipalInterceptor to keep track of the current identity prior to switching to a new identity created using the RunAs principal. The exploit consist that the EJBComponent#incomingRunAsIdentity field is currently just a SecurityIdentity. This means in a concurrent environment, where multiple users are repeatedly invoking an EJB that is configured with a RunAs principal, it's possible for the wrong the caller principal to be returned from EJBComponent#getCallerPrincipal. Similarly, it's also possible for EJBComponent#isCallerInRole to return the wrong value. Both of these methods rely on incomingRunAsIdentity. Affects all versions of JBoss EAP from 7.1.0 and all versions of WildFly 11+ when Elytron is enabled.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A race condition in JBoss EAP/WildFly's EJBComponent allows an incomingRunAsIdentity field (a shared SecurityIdentity) to be overwritten by concurrent thread invocations. When multiple users repeatedly call an EJB configured with a RunAs principal, the getCallerPrincipal() and isCallerInRole() methods can return the wrong caller's identity due to this lack of thread-local storage.

MitigationImplement thread-local storage for incomingRunAsIdentity using ThreadLocal<SecurityIdentity> to ensure each thread maintains its own caller identity context, or disable RunAs configuration if not required.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Jboss Enterprise Application PlatformApplication
Affected:>= 7.1.0
Openstack PlatformApplication
Affected:= 13.0
WildflyApplication
Affected:>= 11.0.0, < 26.1.1= 27.0.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify installed WildFly version
    Check the version manifest: cat $JBOSS_HOME/wildfly-version.properties or look at the product.conf file in $JBOSS_HOME/bin
    Affected if Installed WildFly version is >= 11.0.0 and < 26.1.1, or equals 27.0.0
  2. Identify installed JBoss EAP version
    Check the version manifest: cat $JBOSS_HOME/jboss-eap-version.properties or check the product.conf file in $JBOSS_HOME/bin
    Affected if Installed JBoss EAP version is >= 7.1.0
  3. Identify installed Red Hat OpenStack Platform version
    Run openstack version or check the installed packages: rpm -qa | grep -i openstack
    Affected if OpenStack Platform version equals 13.0
  4. Check for EJB RunAs configuration
    Search for <run-as> elements in deployed EJB jar files or in the jboss-ejb3.xml and ejb-jar.xml deployment descriptors: find $DEPLOYMENT_DIR -name '*.xml' -exec grep -l 'run-as' {} \;
    Affected if Any EJB bean is configured with a RunAs principal (run-as identity)
  5. Verify concurrent EJB usage
    Review application access patterns or logs for simultaneous requests to EJBs with RunAs configuration from multiple users or threads
    Affected if Multiple users or threads concurrently invoke the same EJB configured with RunAs

You are affected if you run a vulnerable WildFly (11.0.0 to 26.1.0 or 27.0.0), JBoss EAP 7.1+, or OpenStack 13.0 AND have EJBs configured with RunAs principal that receive concurrent requests from multiple users.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 26.1.1 or later
Fixed in 26.1.1
Interim mitigation

Implement thread-local storage for incomingRunAsIdentity using ThreadLocal<SecurityIdentity> to ensure each thread maintains its own caller identity context, or disable RunAs configuration if not required.

Recommended fix High confidence

WildFly 26.1.1+ or WildFly 27.0.1+ (or corresponding JBoss EAP update)

  1. 1. Identify the currently running WildFly or JBoss EAP version using the server startup logs or management console.
  2. 2. For WildFly 11.0.0 through 26.x: Upgrade to WildFly 26.1.1 or later.
  3. 3. For WildFly 27.0.0: Upgrade to WildFly 27.0.1 or later.
  4. 4. For JBoss EAP 7.1.0+: Apply the appropriate JBoss EAP update that addresses this vulnerability (consult Red Hat security advisory RHSA-2022:*).
  5. 5. After upgrade, restart the application server and verify EJB security behavior under concurrent load.
  6. 6. Test that EJBComponent#getCallerPrincipal and EJBComponent#isCallerInRole return correct values for all authenticated users.
Caveat Ensure application does not rely on previous incorrect behavior; review any custom RunAs principal configurations for compatibility

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Jboss Enterprise Application Platform Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing12.0 h
  • Review / QA6.0 h
40.0 hours of engineering $6,960
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $11,136.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-0866 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-0866 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data